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Being in the lucky position to have received a Jean Monnet Fellowship at the 
European University Institute, I had the possibility to spend the academic year of 
1993-1994 in the cradle of renaissance art and of the central perspective.
Besides "extra-academic" inspiration, and the luxury of uninterrupted time 
for reading and writing, this stay provided the opportunity to participate in two 
courses conducted by professor Yota Kravaritou on "Approches féministes du droit 
en Europe et aux Etats-Unis" and "Droits de l’homme, droits de femme et égalité".
These courses and participation in the meetings of the ECC Interdisciplinary 
Women’s and Gender Studies Group at the institute presented a possibility to 
become more acquainted with general discussions about feminist jurisprudence and 
feminist studies in other parts of Europe and the European Union as well as 
beyond Europe.
I hope that this Working Paper may in return benefit interested individuals 
and groups at the European University Institute as well as outside.
The following text forms a chapter in a larger manuscript entitled "Homeknit- 
ted law. Norms and Values in Gendered Rulemaking", which was written during 

























































































































































































ON WOMEN AND LEGAL FORMS
"..it is obvious that categories and classes which serve very well for one purpose 
may break down when used in a different context"1’
EXCLUSION OF WOMEN’S LIVES AND EXPERIENCES FROM WESTERN LAW 
The art historian Ernst Gombrich in an essay on "Norm and Form" deals 
specifically with the stylistic categories of art history and their origin in 
renaissance ideals. Many of the stylistic terms used by art historians originated, 
he writes, as ways of criticizing a stylistic deviation from the - classical - norm.
The terminology of art history was largely built on what Gombrich calls 
"terms of exclusion", or "principles of exclusion". For those who follow the classical 
canon the disharmonious, the arbitrary, and the illogical must be taboo.
These terms of exclusion were negative terms like the Greek term Barbarian 
meaning only a non-Greek,2’ and their use and frequency in our language illus­
trate "the basic need in man to distinguish ’us’ from ’them’, the world of the 
familiar from the vast, unarticulated world outside that does not belong and is 
rejected" (1978, p.88).
Gombrich claims that most movements in art erect some new taboo, some 
principle of exclusion, and he suggests that
" Maybe we would make more progress in the study of styles if we looked out 
for such principles of exclusion, the sins any particular style wants to avoid, than 
if we continue to look for the common structure or essence of all the works 
produced in a certain period." (1978, p.89).
1. Gombrich, E.H. (1978): Norm and Form. The Stylistic Categories of Art History and their Origin 
in Renaissance Ideals. In the same "Norm and Form. Studies in the Art of the Renaissance", 
Phaidon, London and New York, p.88
2. As examples of such "exclusive" terminology, Gombrich mentions "gothic being increasingly used 
as a label for the not-yet-classical, the barbaric, and barocco for the no-longer-classical, the 




























































































The categorization of certain types of norms and patterns of order as "law" has 
certainly had as the result an exclusion of a great number and variety of normative 
phenomena and types of social order. These are not just those which came to be 
labelled primitive or traditional law (not-yet-modern-law) or religious or moral 
norms (no-longer-law) or customary law (only-seldom-law).
The increasing differentiation of the concept of law itself into "exclusive" 
concepts, such as for instance non-state law, non-western law, indigenous law, 
informal law, women’s law etc. indicates some principles of exclusion which have 
been at work in the formation of the category of "law". - The exclusion of many of 
these types of orders has implications for women, since several of them are 
concerned with normative approaches to relations which are of great - and perhaps 
specific? - importance in the lives of women.
But not only has the exclusion of these other types of orders had implications for 
women. I also want to argue that one of the principles of exclusion in western law 
has been, and to a large degree still is the exclusion of women, either directly as 
women (female persons) or of the realities, experiences and bodies of women.
For a long period women were excluded as women from participating in the 
law-making process and other "public" arenas - from the vote, from being 
considered as legal actors, from owning property, and from certain occupations. 
And the regulation and ordering that took place within the private arena of the 
family was not considered "law".
After women have become citizens in their own right, a number of regulations 
which have gender specific consequences have continued to exist or have come into 
being - in areas such as family law, welfare law and labour law, but not only here.
The "gender neutralization" of laws - as legal statutes - in the last third of the 
twentieth century has been seen mainly as an achievement for women and as a 
step towards emancipation and equality.
It is only recently that the benefits of the process of gender neutralization and 
alleged gender equality is beginning to become questioned from several angles - 
from eco-feminists, postmodern feminists, cultural feminists and non-western 
feminists. This is a process which resembles the increasing questioning of the 




























































































Much of the feminist critique of law has not questioned the category of 
(modern) law as such - as a category or a form, which focuses upon an abstract, 
rule-oriented type of social order. Even when modern law becomes formally gender 
neutralized it still to a large degree does not take into consideration that formally 
gender neutral regulations relate to gendered living experiences and thus have 
different implications for men and women. This goes for national as well as for 
international law - for instance human rights.
And when modern law becomes formally gender neutralized this does not 
change the criteria that have been established for which normative phenomena 
belong to the category of law. That these criteria lead to exclusion of a number of 
norms which order and control the lives of women, such as norms and practices 
about the division of labour in the family and outside the paid labour market, is 
seldom discussed.
It has been discussed whether you can just "add women and stir" to the disciplines 
of science which have excluded women’s lives, or whether more thorough changes 
of categories - of for instance what is considered knowledge or social order - will 
be necessary. - There seem to be increasing signs that it will be indispensable with 
more fundamental changes (Harding 1991).
For a long time investigations concerning "women" have been considered 
dealing with and presenting "specific" problems and approaches as contrasted to 
a "normal" or "general" scientific perspective. If we are by now reaching a stage 
where this "classical", "normal" or "central" perspective is undergoing a certain 
dissolution, then yesterday’s "norm” may also become tomorrow’s exception. The 
uniform style seems to be fading in relation to fashion, and we may witnessing a 
similar development in relation to norms.
It may be difficult to encompass diverse mushrooming dress styles of different 
subcultures under a unified dictate of the fashion of the season. - And it may 
probably not be possible to include all social practices under the concept of law 
without dissolving the concept of law into the broader category of social norms.
But then on the other hand preserving the modern concept of law, as it has 




























































































when it has to be used in different contexts in order to contribute to the solution 
of problems and to deal with realities and practices of different groups.3’
These will be groups, I believe, which are themselves characterized by con­
flicts and experiences different from those which provided the foundation for the 
categorization of certain normative phenomena as the "law" of "modern" societies. 
These differences will not only be characteristic of the groups themselves but also 
of their environments and the societies or parts of societies in which they live.
Gombrich characterizes the principle of exclusion as a very simple principle that 
excludes not just for formal, categorical reasons, but also because it denies the 
values it opposes. - This seems to be very true also of the categorization of certain 
normative forms or forms of order, which are excluded from belonging to the
category of "law".
Gombrich suggests - in the classification of art - a principle of sacrifice. This 
principle may also be useful in contemplations about categories concerning other 
forms of order than artistic order4’
"The principle of sacrifice admits and indeed implies the existence of a multiplicity 
of values. What is sacrificed is acknowledged to be a value even though it has to 
yield to another value which commands priority. But the mature artist will never 
sacrifice more than is absolutely necessary for the realization of his highest values. 
When he had done justice to his supreme norm other norms are allowed to come 
into their own." (1978, p.97)
If we (in the western world) want to continue to call law only that which is 
practised by professional lawyers and which subscribes to modern values, then 
persons interested in for instance questions concerning gender and social order 
may have to turn to other areas than "law" if they (we) want to understand and 
also participate in and support specific and concrete changes. This process is 
already on the way and will most likely continue.
If one does not consider upholding of a certain category and understanding 
of "law" itself the essential issue, then one may also have to find out what are the 
highest values, and try to find forms and categories which sacrifice as little of
3. This is also commented upon in the context of art, where Martin Damus in a sequence of three 
articles entitled "Die Verabschiedung der Moderne. Von elitar-moderner zu affirmativ-postmoderner 
Kunst" (1989), writes that "Contrary to the individually characterized art of modernity, which 
claims generality, postmodern art is concrete and related to itself and the immediate environment, 
and connected to a specific context" (my translation) (I Teil, p.65).




























































































these values as possible, when participating in the solutions of problems 
concerning social order - and the relation between order and gender.
In postmodern society it may become more important - at least for some period - 
for the scientist and lawyer - to become a participant and part of the process of 
creation of both knowledge and solution of concrete problems.
This is an aspect, which Boaventura de Sousa Santos has dealt with in 
several of his articles. In his article "Towards a postmodern understanding of law" 
he writes that
"The modern understanding of law sacralized law and trivialized rights. The 
postmodern understanding of law trivialized law and sacralizes rights" (1989, 
p.117)
This view indicates that rights - content - become valued higher than form - ’law’.
The usefulness of Gombrich’s principle of sacrifice, could perhaps be displayed 
especially in concrete situations, where there is a need to decide, how different 
norms and values - concerned with different rights - which are or seem to be in 
conflict, should be balanced against each other.
Gombrich claims that "(M)ost stylistic changes have more to do with the 
mutual adjustment of conflicting norms which can perhaps be understood but 
never measured by any objective formal criterion." (1978, p.97f). As law increasing­
ly is becoming viewed as a cultural phenomenon, this observation perhaps also 
holds for the changes of legal classifications, styles and concepts.
The lack of belief in legal positivism deprives us of one objective standard, 
measure or criterion, according to which one can decide about the "goodness" or 
"badness" of a normative system. Thus we will increasingly have to balance and 
sacrifice, in the adjustment of conflicting norms only some of which are at present 
categorized as law.
In the following section I will deal briefly with some of the other excluded voices, 





























































































UNDERSTANDINGS AND CRITIQUES OF MODERN LAW 
In Western countries and at law schools and universities in these societies there 
seems to have been at least some agreement about what was encompassed under 
the category of ’law’, and thus what has had to be taught to future lawyers.
This view of law initially served to distinguish it from past, traditional law. 
It saw and sees law as very linked to modern institutions primarily the state and 
its institutions of parliament, government and judiciary. It is a view which regards 
law as positive law, as uniform and as having certain universal aspirations. Law 
is described as formal, uniform, universalistic rules created within the framework 
of the nation state (Galanter, 1966).
An increasing number of critical voices are being raised against this understanding 
of law both from inside Western societies and legal communities as well as from 
outsiders both within and outside these communities.
These voices are raised by legal historians, by legal anthropologists and by 
lawyers who have dealt with non-western countries, and whose work has 
demonstrated some of the difficulties with the use of the Western concept of law; 
by non-western lawyers (many of whom are trained in western law), who underline 
the non-universality and ethno-centricity of the western concept of law; by the 
post-modern critics of western law, who also question law’s universality and see 
it as a historical form which is changing; by the critique of law from ecologists, 
which to some extent links with the postmodern critique; and by the feminist 
critics of western law, who have especially criticised the androcentricity of law.
My own roots have been especially in the last strand of critique, and especially 
within the environment of Nordic Women’s Law, and Nordic critical studies of 
law.’1 - Over the years I have however been heavily influenced by writing and 
contact with representatives of some of the other strands of critique.
The following presentation thus does not pretend to give a general overview 
of these other critiques, but rather to present some of the lines of thought which 
I have found valuable in the attempt to include the views and experiences of 5
5 . I have been involved in Nordic women’s law since 1975 when I participated in the first Meeting 
of Female Nordic lawyers, which has since been held every 2-3 years. From 1983-1993 I was the 




























































































women in an understanding of law - an understanding which has thus also become 
a process of rethinking of law.
These lines of criticism take part in the general discussion about the 
adequacy or inadequacy of inherited categories and are also participating in the 
ongoing process of réévaluation and transformation of dominant transmitted 
values.
I will not discuss some of the early anthropological and sociological writers which 
have contributed to the critique of the modern concept of law (such as Malinowski 
or Ehrlich), although their work is of course of importance as a background for aca­
demic debate, but limit myself to the debate of the last part of the 20th century 
especially the last two or three decades.
A historical approach
The non-universality of law in a global setting can be underlined by investigating 
it in certain spaces and by stressing temporality. This is what is done by the 
American legal historian, Harold Berman, who employs a historical perspective of 
almost a millenium in his study of the formation of the Western legal tradition.® 
This legal tradition is closely linked to the civilization called "Western", and 
consists of institutions, values and concepts consciously transmitted over centuries. 
In the twentieth century this tradition has however ended up in a crisis more 
severe than any before, and one which is closely linked to the crisis of the 
civilization and its ideals in general.
The concept of law which is embedded in the Western legal tradition, and 
which Berman postulates, is not the prevailing one, but neither is it unorthodox. 
It is a view of law which sees it
"not as a body of rules, but as a process, an enterprise, in which rules have 
meaning only in the context of institutions and procedures, values and ways of 
thought. From this broader perspective the sources of law include not only the will 
of the lawmaker but also the reason and conscience of the community and its 
customs and usages, (p.ll)" 6




























































































Berman’s underlining of the aspects of process, procedures, values and ways of 
thought makes him also advocate an interaction of spirit and matter, of ideas and 
experience in the definition and analysis of law.7’
The historical perspective, and the focus upon a tradition rather than upon 
a formal body of rules, allows both for a broader and less exclusive understanding 
of law, than the modern one, and at the same time of a less universalistic, and 
more contextual understanding.
For Berman it is necessary to broaden the view of law which is now 
prevailing, and he argues for the development of what he calls a social theory of
law.
"We need to overcome the reduction of law to a set of technical devices for getting 
things done; the separation of law from history; the identification of all our law 
with national law and of all our legal history with national legal history; the fal­
lacies of an exclusively political and analytical jurisprudence ("positivism") or an 
exclusively philosophical and moral jurisprudence ("natural-law theory"), or an 
exclusively historical and social-economic jurisprudence ("the historical school," 
"the social theory of law"). We need a jurisprudence that integrates the three 
traditional schools and goes beyond them. Such an integrative jurisprudence would 
emphasize that law has to be believed in or it will not work; it involves not only 
reason and will but also emotion, intuition, and faith. It involves a total social 
commitment."(p.vi,f.)
Without falling prey to often heard equations of women and emotions, there 
seems to be no doubt that an engagement in emotionality, intuition and faith will 
open up for a concern in legal discourse about issues, which are considered 
important also by many women, but which have hitherto been dominated or 
excluded by the focus on reason and rationality.
In this age of an apparent decline of the importance of rationality - or perhaps 
of both dis- and reorientation in this respect, the importance of "extra-rationality" 
in the working of law, and its interrelation with legal reason is perhaps more 
important than ever.
Perhaps for the values of reason and rationality to survive, and not be 
marginalized, they must enter into dialogue with forces and forms of power, they 





























































































Outsider and insider critique of law
Great reservation regarding the feasibility of the western system consisting of law 
and its political framework in a multicultural world was raised two decades ago 
by Adda B. Bozeman, who stressed the limits of both western law and the western 
political system.81
"Whether viewed as a set of concepts, norms, or social institutions, law everywhere 
is linked, explicitly or implicitly, with schemes of social and political organisation. 
Given the meanings carried by law in the West, the public order system here - 
whether subsumed in the city, the kingdom, the empire, the nation state, or the 
international society - has been cast traditionally in terms of the supremacy of law. 
Moreover, since European law has been associated from its beginnings with the 
need felt on the one hand to isolate and protect individual rights, and on the other 
to define the responsibilities of citizenship, government has been viewed 
preferentially as a compact or contract between men. That is to say, in this 
civilization in which the individual human being has been disengaged from the 
group, it is possible to assume that men, be they governors or governed, are 
capable of entering into binding obligations.
Neither of these norms, nor any of the values, beliefs, or perceptions upon 
which they rest, can be presumed to exist in other systems of public order, most 
of them also trusted by the people they enclose, even though they may appear 
overtly coercive from the Occidental point of view" (Bozeman 1971, p.xii,f. - 
emphasis added here).
Even though Bozeman verbally distinguishes between "individual human beings" 
and "men", he most likely did not explicitly include a gender perspective in his 
evaluation of western law outside the West. But a combination of feminist critiques 
of law with non-western critiques of law implies that the questionability of the 
modern understanding of law is extended to and creeping inside the West itself. - 
This process is probably contributing to what Berman sees as the revolutionary 
crisis of the western legal tradition.
Other writers who have dealt more with the legal system in studies of legal 
anthropology or legal pluralism have more explicitly questioned the western 
understanding of law.
Not only individual writers but also international institutions such as the ILO 
increasingly questions the modern legal system although up to now mostly in 
relation to its use in non-western countries.
"The continued growth of a semi-legal informal sector has demonstrated the 
limited effectiveness of the legal and regulatory systems. This should sharpen the 
will of policy-makers to overhaul their regulatory mechanisms - less with a view 
to enforcing unenforceable laws and regulations, but rather to reviewing the 8




























































































appropriateness of certain laws and regulations themselves. There is, indeed, a 
growing move towards greater flexibility in regulation." (1991, p.16)
ILO not just questions the modern legal system itself, but also the modern sector,
which it considers may be part of the problems faced by the - often female -
vulnerable work-force in non-western countries.
"Part of the problem may therefore lie in the so-called ’modern’ sector itself, and 
in the laws, regulations and institutions that were designed primarily for its 
benefit, but which could in some cases be inaccessible, or even harmful, to the 
informal sector" (1991, p.20).
The concepts of the "informal sector" and "informal law" are not linked to 
each other in the sense that one produces the other. They are however both related 
to the modern sector and modern law respectively as phenomena, institutions and 
forms which exclude and disregard intermediate normative structures and forms.
The rise of the informal sector especially in the so called third world makes the 
dichotomic distinction in modern law between the legal and the illegal obsolete. 
The rising participation of women in both formal paid work (especially in the 
socalled first World, West or North) as well as in informal work (in the biggest 
part of the world) makes the distinction between public and private increasingly 
obsolete, and thus also the forms of law (statutory legislation and contract) which 
are based upon this distinction. This makes room for the emergence of other still 
underinvestigated normative forms and patterns, as well as of reflections upon 
other types of order.
Another critical voice against the concepts of western law has been raised by 
the Indian born American law professor, Surya Prakash Sinha.91 He underlines 
and describes the cultural location of the theories of law. Law and legal institu­
tions have played a central role in the particular cultural history of the West, but 
this function has in other societies been fulfilled by other principles of conduct and 
other institutions of social organization (1989a, p.5). He continues to portray some 
of these principles in China, Japan, India and Africa, but the main part of the book 
is dedicated to the description and critique of different western theories of law.
The theories attempting to define law have indulged in the fallacies of either 
assuming "that law exists everywhere, or they have ascribed a civilizationally 
superior status to the Western societies for being possessed of law" (1989b, p.22). 9




























































































This status is however far from as secure as it was, although it may take 
some time before the signs of erosion make themselves shown and are acknowl­
edged more generally.
Legal pluralism
The discussion on legal pluralism has especially been carried on within legal 
anthropology and legal sociology over a period of more than two decades. Much of 
this discussion has focused upon the situation in post-colonial states, where it has 
become very obvious, that the - historically - modern exclusive concept of law, with 
its focus on rules, was not the only normative force to guide societies. There are 
thus other important sources for engendering normativity than the law-maker, who 
is often understood as the sole producer of "modern law".
Sally Falk Moore has introduced the concept of the semi-autonomous social 
field (sasf), and has claimed that it has rule-making capacities as well as means 
to induce or coerce their compliance.10’ She has furthermore argued that an 
inspection of these sasf s suggests that "the various processes that make internally 
generated rules effective are often also the immediate forces that dictate the mode 
of compliance or non-compliance to state-made rules".11’
Moore has carried out a number of studies on the situation in Africa, but in 
this specific article, she draws on western material, more specifically examples 
from women working in the garment industry - ’the better dress line’ in New York. 
The suggestion of taking a sub-state level as a subject of a legal study thus 
necessarily also includes a shift in the attention from the modern concepts of law 
to other concepts of norms which have evolved ’spontaneously’ out of social life.
The link between modernization, modern values, and modern law has been 
underlined by many authors, writing on legal pluralism and the developing - or 
perhaps un-modern - world. John Griffiths writes that "Uniform law is not only 
dependent upon, but also a condition of progress toward modern nationhood (as 
well as of economic and social ’development’)".12’
10. Sally Falk Moore (1978): "Law and social Change: the semi-autonomous social field as an 
appropriate subject of study", pp. 54-81
11. op.cit. p.57




























































































The search for modernity and the subsequent coexistence of different type of 
norms for different "sectors" of society, the modern and the ’un-modern’, has thus 
in many post-colonial states this has lead to a situation of "formal" legal pluralism.
In the societies which were already considered "modern", and "industrialized", 
it seems much more difficult to accept an understanding of legal pluralism. This 
is perhaps the case because a self-description of a society as also encompassing 
plural legal forms, and not only a uniform model, does already also indicate a stage 
or level of either "pre-modernity" or a stage of dissolution "beyond" modernity.
Griffiths defines legal pluralism as a state of affairs, for any social field, in 
which behavior pursuant to more than one legal order occurs. This seems to me to 
be a description or a descriptive definition which encompasses also the situation 
of women in "modern" societies, who act according to both formal and informal law 
and norms which they themselves create in their own interaction in the semi- 
autonomous fields in which they operate, and where they are not only acting 
according to, but also generating norms themselves.131
The usefulness of the concept of legal pluralism in an investigation of 
women’s situation in western societies is to my view due both to the exclusiveness 
of the legal category of "modern law", and to the fact, that modern societies are not 
as modern as they claim to be. There are several parts of modern societies, which 
have not become modernized, and for modernity to survive, this is perhaps not 
possible either.141
Masaji Chiba has wondered why Western scholars are generally so reluctant 
to do research of legal pluralism in their own countries. He has stressed the neces­
sity to develop a new scientific method which can secure accurate observation and 
analysis of the non-Western situation, but also underlines that legal pluralism 
must be extended to Western society.151
Even though the paradigm of legal pluralism may have become the dominant 
in legal sociology, as Griffith has claimed in a later paper (1992) this is still not the 
case in legal science itself where the old paradigm of the uniform, national legal 1345
13. Hanne Petersen (1992): On Women and Legal Concepts: Informal Law and the Norm of
Consideration
14. See also Edward Shils (1981): Tradition, where he discusses the limits of modernity





























































































system, eventually complemented by one or more supra-national legal systems, 
continues to dominate in many respects.
The non-universality, the non-formality and the non-uniformity of (western) law 
which is stressed by the above mentioned authors in discussions on legal history, 
legal pluralism and legal theory are aspects which are also critized to a greater or 
lesser extent by the western feminist critique of law.
Feminist critiques of law
Most Western feminist critiques of the legal system have largely been ethno-centric 
and have in the initial phase been critiques of the claimed universality and 
uniformity of western law, whereas the formality of law, the state-relatedness and 
the western-ness has not been given as much attention.161
As with several of the other critiques of modern law, feminist critique is 
understood as being specific, coming if not from a direct numerical minority, then 
at least from a group which has historically and academically been considered 
marginal and peripheral.
This has influenced feminist critique all over. In the case of Nordic Women’s 
Law it has during the two decades of its existence always had a local, practical and 
pragmatic approach to its political and academic environment. Its existence and 
presence at some universities is less due to explicit academic acceptance of its 
critiques and its character, and perhaps more to general political conditions, and 
the change of the political and social scene in the Nordic countries where women 
have become more visible during most of the century.
The "political" and action-oriented character of this critique and its 
understanding of law makes Women’s Law perhaps more part of a legal tradition 
underscoring processes and values, and less likely to become fully integrated 
within modern institutions of knowledge such as universities which have up to now 
stressed the technicality, rationality and objectivity of legal knowledge. Nordic 
Women’s Law seems to have and in actual fact has achieved a certain recognition 16
16. This is also underlined in the introducing article by Yota Kravaritou to the anthology edited 




























































































through the work done by individual scholars, where the work of the late 
Norwegian Tove Stang Dahl deserves special attention.
But fighting against the exclusion of women’s lives and experiences in legal 
theory which is caused by a strict concept of law is by no means a stage which has 
been overcome.171
Feminist jurisprudence has criticised western law for being androcentric and 
gender hierarchical. Men and male ways and mores have been at both the 
centre and at the summit of legal thinking (Dahl 1987, Gerhard-Teuscher 1981, 
Mackinnon 1989, Smart 1990).
This criticism of androcentricity - that the legal system has taken male life 
and values as the norm has also been raised by deconstructivists, such as Jacques 
Derrida, who has pointed out that it is not long ago that ’we men’ meant "we, 
grown-up, white male europeans, carnivorous and able to bring sacrifices" (1990,
p.951).
The criticism of gender hierarchy in the legal and social culture of western 
countries is based on the fact that dichotomies such as male/female (or cul- 
ture/nature) are not just dualisms. They are organized hierarchically valuing one 
side higher than the other. Thus it was the grown-up, white male european who 
was entitled to legal standing and legal rights.
We are only slowly beginning to realize the historical and regional contextuality 
and cultural specificity of the legal systems but still often as outsiders within the 
same legal culture or at least often aspiring to become full members of it.
Some of the feminist critiques of western white feminist jurisprudence have 
come from the African American female lawyers, such as Kimberly Crenshaw 
(1988), Patricia Willians (1991) and Regina Austin, who in her article "Sapphire 
Bound!" proposes a legal jurisprudence grounded in the material conditions of the 
lives of black women in the US (1989).
The analysis done within the framework of the comparative legal research project 
"Women and Law in Southern Africa" (WLSA) has also led to some reconsideration 17





























































































of the Northern feminist jurisprudence and the usefulness of the values and claims 
by northern women when struggling for an improvement of the lives of black 
women in different African countries (Armstrong 1992, 1993).
Also the discussion of the legal role of muslim women in muslim countries as well 
as in non-muslim countries may lead to a less ethno-centric approach to the 
critique of law by feminist jurisprudence (see Dahl 1992, Mehdi 1993, Afshar 
1993).
Furthermore a combination of the ecological critique of law with feminist critiques 
may contribute to - and challenge - western feminist jurisprudence (Petersen 
1993a & b).
Western Ecologists have criticized western law for being anthropocentric - 
that is taking human beings (men and women alike) as the starting point for the 
legal system. From this point of view all other living and non-living entities have 
been denied legal standing in modern legal systems. And when you are denied 
legal standing you are very often also denied legal and social protection in 
modern societies. - Secular societies like many western societies do not formally 
protect natural entities - trees, animals, rivers etc. - because of their sacredness, 
as do other orders.
This leads to another critique of legal systems as being based on species 
hierarchies - that is placing the human species at the top of the legal pyramid. 
However the ecological critique may also be enriched by dialogue with feminist 
jurisprudence and other critiques of modern law.
Some of the solutions to this problem of anthropocentricity and species 
hierarchy have been to include other species in the existing legal system through 
concepts such as animal rights and discussions of a granting of legal standing to 
natural entities (Stone 1972, 1987, Feinberg 1974, Sitter 1984, Leimbacher 1988).
It is my allegation that what this critique has sought to obtain is mainly an 
accommodation of modern legal systems to the needs for protection of natural 
entities. A more severe challenge and change of these legal systems would probably 
have to not just to include other interests, groups and species by expanding the 
understanding of "modernity" and modern law, but to even sacrifice some of the 




























































































What has become very clear in the general ecological critique as well as in some 
of the other critiques mentioned earlier is that several of them do in fact 
incorporate a severe critique of the hegemonic values of modernity. The ecological 
critique questions the concepts of development, progress and (economic) growth, 
and it values balance, variation and diversity. These values of balance, variation 
and diversity seem to be contradictory to the modern values of liberty, equality and 
fraternity.
In the following section I will discuss possibilities and limitations in the existing 
western legal tradition of including also women’s lives and experiences in the 
concept of law. This I will discuss in relation to different forms of and theories 
about law, which could or do display an openness which allows for the inclusion 
of plural life styles, living conditions and values.
PRINCIPLES OF SACRIFICE AND INCLUSIVE LEGAL CATEGORIES 
Gombrich argues that an investigation of the categories of art should concentrate 
not on the common traits and aspects utilized to categorize certain phenomena, but 
rather on the principles of exclusion - upon what and who have been excluded from 
the category investigated.
In employing this approach upon the study of "law" I have alleged that the 
principle of excluding norms and practices concerning lives and relations of 
(relevance for) women from the category of modern law has been one important 
principle of exclusion.
There are however a number of legal phenomena and perceptions of the 
concept of law, which if they were considered more important would allow for a 
greater recognition of the lives of women and of the multiplicity of practices and 
values lived out in these lives.
One could perhaps call the search for these a reconstructive or affirmative 
activity for the legal "scientist-cum-participant" (see also Damus 1989). - The 
acceptance or acknowledgement of these concepts of law or theories about law 
could also imply the application of what Gombrich calls a "principle of sacrifice". 
In order to include norms and practices of relevance for the great majority of 




























































































sacrifice - to give up the hegemony of the values so strongly connected to the 
understanding and categorization of modern law. These are the valuation of 
uniform rules which are supposed to be generally valid for everybody.
This is not to say that the values of uniformity, generality and rule-bound 
regulation are to be totally abandoned, but that their hegemony and their claim 
to be the absolute and highest values in any case must be questioned - which in 
fact is already the case.
What has to be sacrificed is (to my view) not the modern values as such, but 
their claim to absolute superiority in every matter. The admittance and acknowl­
edgment of a multiplicity of values will imply a concrete balancing and consider­
ation of the modern values of uniformity, equality and generality against emerging 
"post-modern" - and contested - values such as for instance plurality, diversity, 
difference, spirituality and contextuality, as well as against other forms of "extra­
modern" values such as for instance gender specificity, separation and tradition. 
The undertaking of identifying and confirming a broader range of values is 
probably a venture which can be neither unilateral, unilinear nor once and for all. 
It is a process of which we are already part, and which is likely to go on for a long 
time to come, and I doubt that is will be desirable or possible to proclaim any of 
the emerging values the new dominant values. Hopefully there will be room for 
combinations and clusters of values operating at different occasions and in 
different situations.181
The theories, categories and classifications of legal phenomena, which might be 
less exclusive of women’s experiences and which will be treated below are 
’customary law’, legal polycentricity and legal pluralism, legal hermeneutics, 
postmodern law and theories about legal cultures.
This list again is most certainly not exhaustive but it may indicate some of 
the possibilities of including norms and practices related to women’s lives in the 
study of law - or the possibilities of sensitizing jurisprudence to the realities and 
needs of women. 18
18. One recent example of a discussion of values is the Report of the Director-General of the ILO 
on occasion of the 75th Anniversary of the International Labour Organization 1919-1994. The 
report is entitled "Defending Values, Promoting Change. Social justice in a global economy: An ILO 
agenda." As the title indicates there is little direct attempt to formulate "new" values or priorities 






























































































The concept of customary law as a subcategory under the category of law might be 
a concept which could allow for a greater consideration of experiences and practices 
related to women.191 As already mentioned and as elaborated further upon below, 
this will however require a certain reconsideration and reconceptualization of 
custom. I have already mentioned the differences in the European and the African 
concept of customary law.
Customs obviously existed before the uniform modern legal system. Arnaud 
(1992) has mentioned that it is only with modernity that pluralism becomes a 
problem. Medieval theory on custom considered the people the creator of customary 
law, whose binding force was independent of any additional act of a higher criteria. 
This made it necessary to lay down certain fundamental conditions that had to be 
fulfilled by the creating agency, the people, if their customs were to display binding 
force (Ullmann 1969).
Women, minors, and insane persons were not considered belonging to the 
people, and thus not considered able to create custom. The reason, certain modes 
of behaviour had binding force, was ascribed to the tacit consent, which may be 
described as the will of the people to impose obligations and confer rights (Ullmann 
1980). According to Ullmann
"(t)he conception of Customary Law thus included two elements, namely an 
internal, the tacit consent, and an external - the acts themselves; the former is 
"ratio essendi", the latter "ratio cognoscendi" (Ullmann 1980, p.269).
Consent should be free. Conditions concerning the lapse of time, the 
continuance during a certain length of time were controversial. Conditions were 
also discussed concerning the recognition of the consent - the frequencies of the 
customary external acts. In general a valid custom in both constitution and 
abrogation of laws, produced the same effects as legislative acts. - Thus there 
existed no hierarchy between custom and legislation.
The reasonableness of custom was an element necessary for its validity. 
Customs which proved disruptive to the established political order were not valid 
(Ullmann 1969). 19
19. This section is partly based upon my earlier paper (1992b) "Reclaiming Juridical Tact? 




























































































This independence of locally generated customs constituted a threat to the 
uniforming intentions of the modern legal system of the nation state.
Since it was not possible to suppress them totally they were accepted as true 
legal norms recognized by a monistic legal understanding and jurisprudence, 
provided they meet certain criteria. These criteria concern the generality, the 
stability and the duration of the custom in question as well as its recognition by 
a state legal authority (the courts). Mostly criteria which were taken over from 
medieval theory and modified for the - limited - use in a uniform modern legal 
system. The English integration of customary law in modern law has taken place 
through common law. But Peter Goodrich underlines that common law was 
"neither commonly available nor readily accessible to the people it supposedly 
represented".
"It was for the courts to decide the nature of any given custom and it would be 
naïve in the extreme to suppose that the early local courts were immune to the 
political and economic pressures of the feudal nobility they served." (1986, p.63)
Thus Goodrich is of the opinion that
"contrary to the prevalent view of law as the perfection and inheritor of custom., 
it is probably a more accurate generalization to see law or ’legal order’ as a 
destructive force, as the assassin rather than the pinnacle of non-legal or 
customary orders" ( 1986, p.63f).
He relates this to the relationship between European and non-European cultures 
as a specifically significant example.
If one considers the fact that customs are not only specific according to social 
groups and classes, but also according to gender, his observations hold true also 
in the European context.
The creation of practices and informal law in women’s workplaces, which I 
investigated in the relationship between paid work-life and family-life of women 
employed in the public sector in Denmark, constitute one among other examples 
of gendered practices and customs.201 When investigating the cases concerning in­
dustrial customs which had been accepted and dealt with by the arbitration courts, 
I found however hardly any traces of these gender-specific customs. The actual 
gender specific customs were thus excluded from those customs which in the 
modern legal system might qualify to be considered "customary law". 20
20. Hanne Petersen (1991): Informel ret pâ kvindearbejdspladser. En retsteoretisk og empirisk 




























































































Ivan Illich in his book(s) on "Gender" makes an observation, which is relevant 
in this respect. In a note on "women and law" he writes,
"All known unwritten, customary law is gender-specific. European written law is 
decidedly patriarchal and the law of the modern nation-state is unfailingly sexist" 
(Illich 1982 p.29, references omitted).
In the German version of the book Illich undertook slight changes. Thus the same 
note is somewhat altered and expanded
"Custom is also gender-specific (see notes 80-83). Also where formal law makes 
custom a source, the result - at least in European history - will be a patriarchal 
order. The constitution of the modern state has sexist consequences exactly where 
it intends to abolish patriarchy. The gender-specific custom, patriarchal law 
(statute) which places women as a group under men, and modern law, which 
assumes that gender-neutral human subjects exist, cannot be investigated with the 
same categories" (Illich 1982, note 17 - my translation).
Since customs - as repetitions of practices - do of course also encompass the 
gendered practices developed by women the category of "customary law" could 
theoretically also encompass customs and practices of relevance for women’s lives. 
It would however have to expand the criteria for when a custom and practice can 
be accepted as "legal" and thus become "customary law".
The period of suppression of custom in national law has at the same time been the 
period where "law” sought to become and claimed to be value-neutral. Ethical and 
philosophical discussions about what is "right" and "good" about law, were of less 
interest.
It seems as if not only law, but also philosophy has fallen prey to the 
hegemony of the modern state. Leiser (an american theologist and philosopher) in 
a small book on "Custom, Law and Morality. Conflict and Continuity in Social 
Behaviour" (1969) writes that "of the great triumvirate - morals, law and custom - 
only one has suffered virtually complete neglect at the hand of philosophers" that 
is custom.
Leiser writes about the relationship between custom and morality or ethics
that
"Custom does determine what is right and wrong, just as it reflects what people 
believe to be right and what they believe to be wrong. In this way it enters into our 
conceptions of moral right and wrong and raises questions in the minds of moral 




























































































time and place is not that of another, so also moral right and wrong differ from 
place to place and from time to time..(Leiser 1969, p.159).
Leiser here deals with a broader concept of custom than those customs which have 
been transformed into customary law.
He underlines the ethical element of custom, the links between custom and 
morality, and asks to what extent and in what sense does custom serve as a source 
of morals; what are the effects of moral prescriptions upon customs and what are 
(or ought to be) their relations (Leiser, p.163).
It could seem that the customs and practices relating to women’s lives and 
experiences are more concerned with processes and principles and with what is 
considered good and bad (in concrete situations) and less with rules and one time 
events. Thus a concept of custom which should be able to encompass women’s 
experiences should be more concerned with process and principles (or rights as de 
Sousa Santos writes) and less with forms and abstract rules. This would however 
easily infringe upon the unifying intentions of the modern legal system.
Legal polvcentricitv and legal pluralism211
Most modern legal theories are dominated by a monistic understanding of 
law. This paradigm asserts that the "legal" order is structured around one centre, 
in relation to which all principles, rules and norms are founded. Legal polycentri- 
city as it has been discussed in the Nordic countries, attempts to study "law” from 
a pluralist approach. - Legal norms are not understood as issued by or linked to 21
21. My views upon legal polycentricity have been developed during my colloboration with different 
colleagues at the University of Copenhagen. During the period from 1990 to 1993 two of my 
colleagues, Henrik Zahle, professor of constitutional law, and Kirsten Ketscher, professor of social 
welfare law, and I had a joint research project on ''Polycentric and Ecological Perspectives on Law" 
financed by the Danish Council of Social Research.
The term "polycentricity" was first used in a Nordic legal context in 1986 by Henrik Zahle 
in an article entitled "Polycentri i retskildelaeren" [Polycentricity in the theory of legal sources". 
One of the publications which has appeared as a result of the research project is Peter Blume & 
Hanne Petersen (eds) (1993): Retlig Polycentri [Legal Polycentricity], Akademisk Forlag, 
Copenhagen (A Festschrift for Henrik Zahle). Another is a special issue of the Nordic legal journal, 
RETFA5RD, (1994) entitled "Law and Ecology”. An anthology edited by Hanne Petersen and Henrik 
Zahle entitled "Legal Polycentricity. Consequences of Pluralism in Law", will hopefully be published 
in 1995.
In 1992 a Finnish research project on ’'Polycentric Law" was initiated by professor Lars D. 
Eriksson, the university of Helsinki, in cooperation with Juha Poyhonen, Ari Hirvonen and Panu 




























































































one exclusive authority to whom or which all other norm initiating entities are 
subjugated. The doctrine of hierarchically structured legal sources is problem- 
atized, and the term legal polycentricity indicates an understanding of legal norms 
- or legal sources - as being engendered by different, overlapping, coexisting, 
cooperating and/or competing centres. They may also be termed semi-autonomous 
fields (Moore 1978) or networks, some of which are equivalent to nation states or 
the economic community, some of which are local but some of which also 
encompass fields or networks which are not delimited by territory (Vanderlinden 
1989).
A legal polycentric approach to law underlines the problems of the professed 
value-free, neutral and so-called objective approach, which has been dominant in 
modern law such as Scandinavian realism. Polycentricity reveals and demonstrates 
not only formal but also axiological differences underlying the different legal 
systems (see also Sinha, 1992). An empirical investigation of different types of 
norms does not automatically include an acceptance of the different values 
underlying these norms. It does however imply a more profound examination and 
evaluation of the different values at stake and a process of reconciling values 
rather than subjugating some under others. There is more than one single source 
for legitimacy and legitimate argumentation.
Norms generated within multiple centres, semi-autonomous fields or networks 
are pluralistic not only in form but also according to the values they promulgate. 
This is a challenge for a hierarchical single-value approach to "legal" order.
Empirical investigations carried out within the framework of legal pluralism 
demonstrate that multiple norms - also in western countries - are not necessarily 
organized hierarchically in the way modern western jurisprudence has primarily 
perceived law. This poses another challenge for the modern legal paradigm.
The origin of the concept "polycentricity" is blurred but it is perhaps mostly used 
in sociopolitical analysis.221
If one should distinguish between legal pluralist and a legal polycentric 
approach to law the difference lies perhaps mainly in the perspective. Whereas the 
legal anthropologist and legal sociologist may mostly tend to understand and 2
22. The concept has for instance been used in the title of a book by Samir Amin (1990): Delinking: 




























































































describe the legal landscape from outside, legal polycentricity approaches legal 
science from within and tries to reach another understanding - and practice - of 
law. Legal polycentricity attempts to contribute to a change of the understanding 
of law from inside. In this sense it may be perceived as a continuation of the 
attempts to develop an "alternative dogmatics" launched originally by our Finnish 
colleague Lars D. Eriksson23’.
Legal pluralism is a well known concept in legal sociology and legal anthropology -
so much that John Griffiths in his article claims that the "new paradigm as far 
as the social scientific study of law is concerned, is legal pluralism". What Griffiths 
understands by legal pluralism is: the legal order of all societies is not an 
exclusive, systematic and unified hierarchical ordering of normative propositions 
depending from the state, but has its sources in the self-regulatory activities of all 
the multifarious social fields present in society.
- As far as the legal dogmatic study is concerned this shift of paradigm has 
however not yet taken place fully. Wilhelmsson stresses that "the paradigmatic 
concept of law is still the (one) and only law of the national state" (1992). This is 
perhaps a somewhat exaggerated statement especially within the framework of an 
expanding legal community such as the European Union, but nevertheless it 
captures much of the climate of contemporary western thinking about law.
The introduction of the concept of legal polycentricity may be understood as 
an attempt to bring about this shift of paradigm, also within legal science 
itself.24' The intention is however not to pave the way for an understanding of the 
regional - European Union-wide - regulation as a hegemonic successor concept, but 
to allow for a greater acceptance of the interrelations and interdependence of 
different types of norms on regional, national, and local levels. - To some extent it 
is a question of réintroduction of earlier concepts of plurality since legal monism 
is a relatively recent phenomenon.
23. A discussion related to the work of Lars D. Eriksson on alternative legal dogmatics can be 
found in Tuori, Kaarlo (ed) (1988): Rattsdogmatikens Alternativ [Alternative to legal dogmatics]. 
Juridica, Tammerfors
24. Another Danish professor of sociology of law, J0rgen Dalberg-Larsen has recently published a 
book, which has been inspired by the discussion on legal polycentricity, entitled "Rettens enhed - 
en illusion? Om retlig pluralisme i teorien og i praksis" [Legal Unity - an Illusion? On legal 




























































































The concepts of pluralism and polycentricity of law have a bearing on a number of 
questions concerning the western understanding of law.
A polycentric approach to law can easily accept that law is not a universal 
principle or order - as argued by Sinha in several of his works. A polycentric 
understanding of law necessarily addresses epistemological questions. What is law 
- or what is considered law? By whom and how?
It is perhaps interested in issues of "order" as much as in "law”. Where and 
how is order brought about ? In which different centres and by whom and how? 
What aspects of such "orders" could be considered legal sources under the present 
conditions? What is the impact of a polycentric understanding of law and/or order 
on established concepts and categories in jurisprudence? How to address and 
understand the division between public law and private law, a division which may 
now be heading towards collapse or implosion, but which has been and in many 
respects still is of importance for many women.
Some of the important and difficult questions raised by the use of concepts as legal 
pluralism and legal polycentricity seem to be axiological questions - questions of 
the values underlying polycentric legal orders and questions of how these differing 
orders conflict, and/or attempt to coexist. Which orders are bearers of which 
values? Some women in the countries of southern Africa may find the unilateral 
focus upon freedom and equality - values highly estimated by Scandinavian 
women’s law - an obstacle to the aim of improving African women’s position in law 
and society in local, rural but also urban contexts.
Conflicts between values of polycentric orders and their solution are impor­
tant questions to deal with for a polycentric approach. Masaji Chiba has described 
how pluralism exists not just in social reality, but also as in subjectivity, causing 
"legal ambivalence" in the individual (1991 & 1992). This very interesting aspect 
has to my knowledge not been dealt with in western jurisprudence.
The theoretical approaches to law, which we have called legal polycentricity, seem 
to allow for an inclusion of multiple norms - and multiple forms - arising from 
multiple centres. This is an approach which is also favourable towards an inclusion 
of a plurality of values. Thus it does also allow for a reflection and incorporation 




























































































Some of the dangers of a polycentric approach is that it may tend to neglect 
intrafield structures and the dominance of some interest groups over others in the 
polycentric landscape. For instance norms developed among women may not reflect 
the lives of all women equally and may not benefit all women equally. - Thus the 
question of the underlying power struggles about the competing norms may become 
more urgent within the framework of a polycentric understanding of law.
Legal hermeneutics
Hermeneutics may be another method to understand "law", which may also to a 
certain extent allow for inclusion of normative aspects of women’s experiences in 
the study of law and legal order.
The focus upon tradition, values, and argumentation in legal reasoning - 
rather than a focus upon absolute certainty or scientific logic - may permit an 
inclusion of normative material and discourse which can be beneficial for women. 
Not necessarily because these traditions and values must in themselves be 
advantageous for women, but because the interpretive method enables material to 
be taken seriously - also when it is criticized - which may otherwise be swept aside 
as irrelevant.
Peter Goodrich describes the "legal art [as] an art of interpretation" and 
hermeneutics as the discipline that studies the rules of interpretation and 
understanding of recorded expression or text - the discipline whose task is that of 
interpreting transmitted texts (Goodrich 1986). For hermeneutics the role of 
history, of the context, of tradition is of utmost importance.
"For hermeneutics understanding and interpretation always takes place within the 
context of tradition and as an elaboration of the values of tradition, themselves 
perceived as the community and common sense of the historically prior culture" 
(Goodrich 1986, p.135).
This importance of tradition in the creation of the new is also underlined in 
a Norwegian textbook discussion of the three central elements of the hermeneutical 
methods, which are described as supposition, the dialectical relation between part 
and totality and the hermeneutical circle (Doublet & Bernt, 1993).
The authors see the normative sciences, to which the legal science belongs, 
as sciences which do not tell anything about how reality is, but how it ought to be. 




























































































past as well as of the present as references for the interpreter of the text. The 
focus upon the contextual framework in hermeneutics according to Bernt and 
Doublet allows for a better understanding of the role that value considerations, 
evaluations and other considerations25’ play not just within legal science but 
especially within the legal method (p.89). Bernt and Doublet consider legal 
hermeneutics a tool which may mediate the tension between the conditions within 
science and its relations to society and value contexts (p.92).
The late Norwegian professor of Women’s Law, Tove Stang Dahl, in 1988 wrote an 
article entitled (in translation) "Towards an interpretive theory of law. The 
argument of women’s law". In this article she argues that an open hermeneutics 
is a methodology which is specifically well suited for a law which is undergoing 
change, no matter whether the legal scientist wants to participate in the ongoing 
changes or not (Dahl, 1988 p.68).
She proclaims that if we want to improve the situation of women in law, from 
what she calls the standpoint of the acknowledgment of everybody as co-legislators, 
then it will soon turn out that the traditional theory of legal application is not very 
suitable.
Some of the areas where she considers that changes are taking place is in the 
application of law which increasingly takes place within the administration. 
Whereas legal dogmatics primarily has been interested in and addressed the 
courts, women’s law has addressed the general public, parliamentarians, the 
administration and women’s groups of different kinds. Legal theory and with it not 
the least women’s law has increasingly become interested in the decisions of the 
first instances both in the judicial and in the administrative hierarchy as well as 
below this level. This presents fruitful challenges also to legal dogmatics.
My own point has been that it is not only the application of "law" which is shifting 
fora as well as level, but that this holds true also for the creation of "law" - there 
is no longer any singular "legislator" or "law-maker" (Guibentif 1993, p.83).
25. The term used in the text (p.89) is "reelle hensyn" which is a specific Norwegian legal term, 
which deals with considerations about equity, related to the discussion about the "nature of the 




























































































The view I have developed has been inspired by Clifford Geertz and others. 
As one of the leading representatives of interpretive anthropology, he has also 
written about similarities between law and anthropology, and has described his 
own approach to adjudication as one that
"assimilates it not to a sort of social mechanics, a physics of judgment, but to a sort 
of cultural hermeneutics, a semantics of action (Geertz 1983, p.182)
He considers law as "part of a distinctive manner of imagining the real" (p.184),
and underlines the "locality" of law.
"Law., is local knowledge; local not just as to place, time, class, and variety of 
issue, but as to accent - vernacular characterizations of what happens connected 
to vernacular imaginings of what can. It is this complex of characterizations and 
imaginings, stories about events cast in imagery about principles, that I have been 
calling legal sensibility." (p.215)
This has implications for the comparative study of law, which according to 
Geertz is neither a matter of reducing concrete differences to abstract 
commonalities, nor of locating identical phenomena masquerading under different 
names. Comparative study of law must "relate to the management of difference not 
to the abolition of it" (p.216), and it should consist in cultural translation. Geertz 
sees law as "meaning, not machinery" (p.232), but this view involves a shift from 
functionalist thinking about law to a hermeneutic thinking about it - "as a mode 
of giving particular sense to particular things in particular places" (p.232). Clifford 
Geertz’s use of the hermeneutical method is thus less related to texts and more to 
the intertwinement of fact and law.
I do agree with Tove Stang Dahl that hermeneutics is probably a useful 
method and concept to grasp and contribute to changes in the legal field, such as 
the changes that are taking place because of attempts of inclusion of some of those 
groups whose experiences have hitherto been excluded from the category of law.
But it seems clear to me that to become truly inclusive, also of the experi­
ences of women and the normative aspects and meaning of women’s experiences, 
the method cannot limit itself to the interpretation of texts. It will have to consider 
other normative material - among that behaviour - and try to contribute to giving 





























































































Within recent legal theory the formal hierarchical concept of law which also served 
as a means for national unification and modernization of societies, can no longer 
uphold its position as the concept which exhaustively is able to cover all normative 
orders encompassed by post-modern or reflexive law (see also Carty 1990, p.lff and 
Douzinas & Warrington, Gaete, and Goodrich, all in Law and Critique 1991)
Post-modern legal theory in the Western world thus understands "law" within 
a context different from the nation state. It claims that some of the implications 
of these developments and conflicts are that the definition of "public interest" can 
no longer be the monopoly of the state, that the individual is no longer the focal 
point of the legal system (it is replaced by groups, organizations, networks and 
perhaps relations), and that the hierarchical unity of legal doctrine and of the legal 
text (especially the written constitution) does no longer hold (Ladeur 1986).
The idea about autonomous social subsystems, as the relevant legal 
framework, which is central to the theory of reflexive law, is very close to Sally 
Falk Moore’s concept of the "semi-autonomous social field". The theories about 
reflexive law are based on descriptions of existing trends and tendencies within the 
legal system as well as on prescriptions about how and in which direction the legal 
system ought to develop.
The theories are linked together by a perception of the vanishing importance 
of the state level and of law as a state instrument to bring about material social 
change. Focus is shifted from state level to other levels among them subsystem le­
vel, and from material law to procedural law. Some of the consequences of these 
developments within the field of law are considered to be that legal theory and 
legal dogmas will become relativized (Ladeur 1986).
In an article which has been translated into English, "The Discourse on the 
Sciences" Boaventura de Sousa Santos underlines the changing paradigm of 
sciences, as among others one where all scientific knowledge aims at becoming 
common sense.
"Post-modern science tries to rehabilitate common sense for it recognizes in this 
form of knowledge some capacity to enrich our relationship with the world. 
Common sense knowledge, it is true, tends to be a mystified and mystifying 
knowledge, but in spite of that, and in spite of its conservative quality, it does have 
a utopian and liberating dimension that may be enhanced by its dialogue with 




























































































Common sense is characterized by collapsing cause and intention - which is clear 
when women for instance act in consideration of other women’s relations and 
obligations outside the work-place. Common sense is practical and pragmatic, it 
is self-evident and transparent, as well as superficial, but for this reason also 
capable of capturing complexity. Common sense knowledge is non-disciplinary and 
non-methodical, and finally it is rhetorical and metaphorical "it does not teach, it 
persuades" (p.45).
In the emergent paradigm, de Sousa Santos claims, knowledge is both total 
and local, as it is "gathered around themes adopted by concrete social groups at a 
given time as projects of local life" (p.38).
"Though total, post-modern knowledge is not deterministic, though local, it is not 
descriptive. It is knowledge about the conditions of possibility. It is knowledge 
about the conditions of possibility of human action projected into the world from 
local time-spaces. Such knowledge is relatively unmethodical since it springs from 
methodological plurality" (p.39).
The implication of this is a break-up of the disciplines, and a knowledge oriented 
towards solutions of concrete problems and projects. This has implications also for 
the concepts and categories utilized, among those the concepts of law and 
causality, which are put into question.
"In biology, where interactions among phenomena and forms of self-organization 
in non-mechanical totalities are more visible, but also in the other sciences the 
notion of law has been partially replaced by the notions of systems, structure, 
pattern, and finally by the notion of process. The decline of the hegemony of laws 
is parallel to the decline of the hegemony of causality" (p.26f, emphasis added 
here).
Such a shift from a focus upon form to a focus on content and process may 
allow for an inclusion of the lives and experiences of women and other human 
beings - and perhaps also of non-human beings - in the concerns of "lawyers" and 
others interested in social order.261 26
26. In my empirical work I realized the importance of patterns and processes in the lives of women. 
This importance has been further underlined by my acquaintance with the empirical work by 
WLSA on maintenance and inheritance, which repeatedly stresses that phenomena of great 
significance for women, such as maintenance, marriage and inheritance, take place not as rule- 
bound one time events but in the form of complex processes over time which may be the subject of 




























































































Theories about legal cultures
The emergence of a body of literature and a field of study under the heading of 
"legal culture" or "law and culture" since World War II and especially in recent 
years is another indicator of the non-universality of western law27’.
The Indian lawyer Upendra Baxi in an article on "The Conflicting Conceptions 
of Legal Culture" refers to two complex meanings of culture, where the first is 
culture as an "inner process" and the second is culture as a "general process". This 
distinction he sees as being related to the distinction between "culture of the law" 
and "law as culture" in sociological jurisprudence.
"The ’inner’ processes which the notion of culture of law directs us to grasp are the 
processes of producing meanings which produces practices and of practices which 
produce meanings within the presumed agencies of ’legal life’. The ’general 
processes’ which the notion of law as culture directs us to is the law as social 
configuration providing ’whole ways of life”' (Baxi 1991, p.273).
According to Baxi the conception of law as culture typically lends itself to an 
epochal analysis of culture, whereas legal culture viewed as a culture of law is 
particularistic, and focusses on the lived relationships between societal values, 
beliefs and attitudes articulated through law and law-related social behaviour.
In accordance with Gombrich’s ideas of the principle of exclusion the introduction 
of the term "legal culture" may indicate a reaction against the relative suppression 
or disinterest in the framework of law in the beginning of the century, when law 
was viewed as machinery in line with the dominance of the natural sciences also 
in the humanities.
With increasing empirical evidence of the non-universality of law as well as 
the growing challenges of this view of law as universal the theories of law and 
culture seem to offer a possibility of approaching law as a multifaceted phenomena, 
inter-dependent with its cultural environment. This development is in accordance 
with the general emerging shift of paradigm in the sciences. In the relation 
between the natural sciences which offered the model for the social sciences for the 
majority of the twentieth century the situation now seems to be the reverse.
27. See Masaji Chiba (1989): Legal Pluralism: Toward a General Theory through Japanese Legal 
Culture. Tokai University Press. Especially Chapter 3 "Cultural Universality and Particularity of 
Western Jurisprudence", Chapter 11 "The Identity Postulate of a Legal Culture" and Chapter 13 




























































































Boaventura de Sousa Santos claims that "to the degree that the natural sciences
are getting closer to the social sciences, the social sciences are getting closer to the
humanities" (1992, p.35). - The human sciences he writes, "have preferred to
understand the world rather them to manipulate it". In this he is in line with Baxi
who in the above mentioned article writes that comparative studies of legal
cultures will help us remove the continual impoverishment of our sensibility,
"they even provide us with a hope that jurisprudence will some day begin to belong 
to the humanities as much as it now does to the social sciences" (Baxi 1991, p.275).
Thus the increased interest in culture and cultural phenomena, also have 
links to the growing interest in hermeneutics and legal pluralism.
The interest for the study of legal culture seems to be growing also in western 
societies. Within the European Union this is probably not surprising given the fact 
that a number of national legal systems come together in attempts to converge, 
harmonize, and coexist, a process which also demonstrates the differences between 
not just the legal systems but even more the socio-cultural environment in which 
these systems are embedded.
The implications of and potentials for theories of legal culture for women have 
only recently begun to be explored.
"Legal culture derives from the civilization and history of each country and is 
crucial in determining the way of life and the condition of women - a condition 
which varies too widely to permit generalisation, but rather demands comparative 
study, which remains to be done."28’
The focus upon "legal cultures" may allow for a greater understanding of some of 
the elements in and around law which contribute to the exclusion of women from 
law.
The deep roots of contemporary law in the patriarchal structure of our 
societies makes it tempting to see our legal culture as part of a patriarchal 
culture.29’ The distinctions between "residual cultures", "emergent cultures" and 
"dominant cultures"30’ may be helpful categories in the analysis of the impact of 
law as culture as well as of the culture of law upon the lives of women.
28. Yota Kravaritou: Feminist Approaches to Law and Cultural Diversity (introduction to anthology 
of the same title edited by Kravaritou - forthcoming)
29. op.cit. p.3
30. This distinction is mentioned by Baxi, who quotes another author of a book on "Marxism and 




























































































The aim of feminist jurisprudence is not just to criticize old categories for 
their exclusive consequences and not just to introduce new categories, but to 
introduce categories which serve the purpose of improving the situation of women 
in law and to sensitize jurisprudence also to the role of gender.
This could perhaps imply a search for and interest in these elements of 
cultural surrounding which have allowed women to keep or develop female 
identities. With increasing acknowledgment of the diversity among women it will 
of course be of utmost importance not to look for any monolithic uniform female 
identity, but to keep an open mind.
I share the hope expressed by Baxi who sees in the interest in legal cultures
"a new hope for jurisprudence, a new hope for the fellowship of juristic learning. 
Possibly, they herald the birth of a new sensibility enabling the thinking humanity 
to suffer and the suffering humanity to think. For long, such a sensibility was 
needed in the human science of jurisprudence; we have at long last now, in 
jurisprudence a whole new structure of feeling equipping us to take people’s 
sufferings seriously” (Baxi 1991, p.269 - notes omitted).
Conclusion
In outlining the principles of exclusion of women’s lives from Western law as one 
of the principles of exclusion in the categorization of normative phenomena that 
are part of the social order, I have only addressed one element among several of 
the elements which have been excluded from the category of "law".
The exclusion of body, emotions and suffering from consideration in western 
law has important impact for both women and men.
The section on understandings and critiques of modern law only deals with 
some of the strands of critique. - Critiques which for me have been of importance 
in understanding the feminist critique and feminist jurisprudence, but which do 
not cover the variety of critiques, which could have been discussed, nor the 
profundity of the critiques dealt with. What seems to me to unite these approaches 
and feminist jurisprudence are that all of them attempt to understand the 
limitations of modern law.
The section on inclusive legal categories again discusses categorizations of law 
which are not necessarily dealing specifically with the role of women nor with the 
relation between women and law, but which will allow for an inclusion of some of 




























































































lives. Experiences and practices which give meaning to women’s lives and which 
since they rest on meanings and values contribute to the formation of new 
practices and normative experiences of relevance and importance for women - but 
not only for women.
Some of these inclusive categories seem to me to offer a hope, not just for a 
jurisprudence becoming more aware of some of the sufferings of some of the women 
who form part of humanity - but also for women, who may because of the 
expansion and increased sensibility of legal thought become and consider ourselves 
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